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The Physician-Patient Privilege in Virginia
JA=VES W. PAYNME, JR.
It seems settled that at common law there was no privilege
whereby either a patient or a physician could suppress evi-
dence of communications made by one to the other. Most
commentators have argued that there is no justification for
such a privilege. See, e.g., Chafee, "Is Justice Served or
Obstructed by Closing the Doctor's Mouth on the Witness
Stand?", 52 Yale L. J. 607 (1942). Professor Charles T. Mc-
Cormick, who urges that there should be no such privilege,
makes the following comment:
It seems that the only purpose that could possibly jus-
tify the suppression in a law suit of material facts learned
by the physician is the encouragement of freedom of
disclosure by the patient so as to aid in the effective
treatment of disease and injury. To attain this objective,
the immediate effect of the privilege is to protect the
patient against the embarrassment and invasion of
privacy which disclosure would entail. But if this were
the only interest involved it is hard to suppose that the
desire for privacy would outweigh the need for complete
presentation of the facts in the interest of justice. Mc-
Cormick, Evidence 212 (1954).
The physician, however, is usually considered, at least by his
patients, as under an ethical duty not to divulge the patients'
confidential disclosures. This factual situation has been rec-
ognized in more than two-thirds of the states by statutes of
varying scope which create a privilege to suppress evidence
of such confidences or of information gained by the physician
as a result of the confidential relationship. Virginia enacted
such a statute in 1956, the text of which is as follows:
Communications between physicians and patients.-
Except at the request of, or with the consent of, the
patient, no duly licensed practitioner of any branch of
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the healing arts shall be required to testify in any civil
action, suit or proceeding at law or in equity respecting
any information which he may have acquired in attending,
examining or treating the patient in a professional capac-
ity if such information was necessary to enable him to
furnish professional care to the patient; provided, how-
ever, that when the physical or mental condition of the
patient is at issue in such action, suit or proceeding or
when a judge of a court of record, in the exercise of sound
discretion, deems such disclosure necessary to the proper
administration of justice, no fact communicated to, or
otherwise learned by, such practitioner in connection with
such attendance, examination or treatment shall be privi-
leged and disclosure may be required. This section shall
not be construed to repeal or otherwise affect the pro-
visions of §65-88 relating to privileged communications
between physicians and surgeons and employees under
the Workmen's Compensation Act; nor shall the pro-
visions of this section apply to information communicated
to any such practitioner in an effort unlawfully to procure
a narcotic drug, or unlawfully to procure the administra-
tion of any such drug. Va. Code Ann. § 8-289.1 (1950).
The purpose of this discussion is to note the more obvious
limitations on the privilege as set out in the statute; to attempt
clarification of some of the ambiguities in the statute; and,
finally, to consider and make recommendations with reference
to some of the situations in which the trial judge may be called
upon to exercise his discretion to allow or disallow a claim of
the privilege. Consider the following topics suggested by the
statute:
1. Relationship required.
(a) What professional class is brought within the scope of
the statute? The section speaks of a "duly licensed practitioner
of any branch of the healing arts" and is to be contrasted with
other state acts which usually speak of "physician"; "physi-
cian and surgeon"; "licensed physician or surgeon"; or, as in
North Carolina, "person duly authorized to practice physic
or surgery." Under the statutes in other states such persons
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as chiropractors, druggists, dentists, nurses (who are not in
attendance as the physician's assistant), and veterinarians
have been excluded from the scope of the privilege. See cases
in Annot., 39 A.L.R. 1421 (1925) ; Annot., 68 A.L.R. 176 (1930) ;
Annot., 169 A.L.R. 678 (1947). It is entirely possible that the
Virginia statute may be interpreted as including such persons,
with the exception of veterinarians, who would probably not
be acting in a professional capacity within the meaning of
the statute in "attending, examining or treating" a human
patient with the purpose of furnishing professional care to
such a patient. It might be interesting to note that in Steinbeck
v. Metzger, 63 F. 2d 74 (1933), a chiropractor was held to be
within the phrase "healing art."
(b) Who is a "patient" within the meaning of the statute?
Aside from the references to the Workmen's Compensation
Act and to the "patient" who seeks unlawfully to procure a
narcotic drug or an administration thereof, which are self-
explanatory, it is clear from the statute that only the patient
who seeks the services of the physician or healer to obtain
"professional care" or treatment is entitled to claim the
privilege, and then, only information gained by the physician
in "attending, examining or treating" such a patient is
covered by the privilege. It would seem clear, therefore, that
the privilege would not apply in such illustrative instances
as the following: Where the physician is appointed by the
court; where the physician is employed by an insurance com-
pany to examine the "patient" as an applicant for life in-
surance; where the physician gains his information before the
patient comes to him for treatment or after the patient has
been discharged; where the physician obtains information
during an autopsy; where the physician examines the patient
at the instance of the patient or the police to determine intoxi-
cation; or where the patient is sent to the physician by his
lawyer for an examination as an aid to the lawyer in his
preparation for trial. However, in the last case noted there
is a strong possibility that the attorney-client privilege would
operate to seal the physician's lips, and in this event the dis-
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cretion of the trial judge could not operate in any such free-
wheeling fashion as that suggested by the Virginia statute
dealing with the physician-patient privilege. That the attor-
ney-client privilege may be involved in such a situation is sug-
gested by such cases as San Francisco v. Superior Court, 37
Cal. 2d 227, 231 P. 2d 26, 25 A.L.R. 2d 1418 (1951). Briefly, the
reasoning is as follows: The physician is an intermediate
agent for communication between the client and his attorney.
If the client himself describes his condition to the attorney
there can be no doubt that the communication is privileged. It
is no less the client's communication when it is given by the
client to an agent for transmission to the attorney, and this is
true whether the agent is the agent of the attorney, the client,
or both. See also 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2317 (3d ed. 1940).
2. Who may claim. the privilege? (See McCormick, Evi-
deizce § 105 (1954) for a discussion of this problem generally
and as authority for the ensuing discussion.)
Generally, the patient is the holder of the privilege and has
the exclusive right to claim or waive it. Consequently, if the
patient is in a position to assert his claim of the privilege and
fails to do so, there is a waiver, and no one else may assert the
privilege for him. However, the trial judge, in his discretion,
may invoke the privilege if the patient is absent. In any event,
the privilege being personal, the adverse party cannot claim
error because of the erroneous denial of the patient's privilege.
Professor McCormick notes:
A rule that the privilege terminated with the patient's
death would have reached a common sense result which
would have substantially lessened the obstructive effect
of the privilege. The courts, however, have not taken this
tack but hold that the privilege continues after death.
Nevertheless, in contests of the survivors in interest with
third parties, e.g., actions to recover property claimed to
belong to the deceased, actions for the death of the de-
ceased, or actions upon life insurance policies, the per-
sonal representative, heir or next of kin, or the beneficiary
in the policy may waive the privilege, and by the same
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token, the adverse party may not effectively assert the
privilege. In contests over the validity of a will, where
both sides-the executor on the one hand and the heirs
or next of kin on the other-claim under and not ad-
versely to the decedent, the assumption should prevail
that the decedent would desire that the validity of his
will should be determined in the fullest light of the facts.
Accordingly in this situation either the executor or the
contestants may effectively waive the privilege without
the concurrence of the other.
Three comments might be made with reference to Mc-
Cormick's summary of the status of the privilege after the
patient's death: (a) The Virginia statute would seem to
authorize the trial judge, as an exercise of sound discretion,
to disallow the privilege in almost any conceivable case after
the death of the patient. (b) In many or most of these cases
the physical or mental condition of the patient might be in
issue so that under the express terms of the statute the
privilege could not be invoked. (c) In the last case noted by
Professor McCormick a useful analogy might be drawn from
the status of the attorney-client privilege in a will contest. In
Hugo v. Clark, 125 Va. 126 (1919), the Virginia court required
an attorney, in effect, to testify over the objection of the
proponents of a will, that the testator had executed a later
document revoking the will offered for probate. The court
suggested that generally the privilege does not apply in
litigation, after the client's death, between parties all of whom
claim under the client. The court states at p. 129:
The reason, for excluding such communications, stated
succinctly, is that it is essential to the administration of
justice that clients should feel free to consult their legal
advisers without any fear that their disclosures will be
thereafter revealed to their detriment. As a matter of
public policy, this rule should be rigidly enforced in order
that men may secure legal advice, after frank disclosures
to their counsel without which they would be unable to
defend themselves from threatened wrong. After the
death of the client, however, it has been. held that the
privilege may be waived when the character and reputa-
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tion of the deceased are not involved, by his executor or
administrator, or in will contests by his heirs or legatees.
The deceased has no longer any interest in the matter.
3. In wzat kind of proceeding is the privilege applicable?
This question may be answered very briefly. The statute
expressly excepts Workmen's Compensation proceedings; and,
with this exception, the privilege applies only in a "civil ac-
tion, suit or proceeding." (Emphasis added.) Also it might
be suggested that in malpractice proceedings the physical or
mental condition of the patient would be in issue so as to
permit the physician to speak in his defense. The same reason-
ing would be applicable to eliminate the privilege in lunacy
proceedings or in some will contests, e.g., where it is alleged
that the testator lacked testamentary capacity or perhaps that
he executed the will under duress.
4. A consideration of some circumstances in which the trial
judge may be called upon to exercise discretion in allowing or
disallowing the privilege:
Professor Morgan notes:
In 1938 the American Bar Association adopted a recom-
mendation of its Committee on Improvements in the Law
of Evidence stating that the North Carolina statute pre-
scribes a salutary rule and should be adopted in other
states. This provides that the trial judge may require
the disclosure by a physician of a privileged communica-
tion from a patient if in the opinion of the judge such
disclosure is necessary to a proper administration of
justice. M organ, Basic Problems of Evidence 109 (1954).
Virginia haq adopted this suggestion in substance, adding only
that the exercise of discretion must be "sound'"--which would
have been implicit anyway. The salutary effect of this rule
will obviously depend upon the attitude of the trial judge
administering the rule. The principal danger here might well
be an undue sentimental attachment to the privilege which has
been granted limited scope in both the Model Code of Evidence
and in the Uniform Rules of Evidence. Many problems may
beset the conscientious trial judge who is called upon to exer-
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cise the discretion under discussion. The following are sug-
gested as illustrative:
(a) Would the privilege apply when the patient consults
the physician in furtherance of a wrong? When the purpose
of the patient in consulting the physician is unlawful, it would
seem that the privilege should not attach to information gained
by the physician as a result of such a consultation. This is
simply not the kind of relationship between patient and physi-
cian that the law purports to protect in granting the privilege.
The statute perhaps points in the direction of this general
policy position in the specific provision that it shall not apply
to "information communicated to any such practitioner in an
effort unlawfully to procure a narcotic drug, or unlawfully to
procure the administration of any such drug." Thus, by way
of example, the privilege should not attach when the patient
approaches the physician in an effort to procure an unlawful
abortion or when the patient is a fugitive from justice and
seeks the aid of the physician in avoiding arrest. See Mc-
Cormick, Evidence § 102 (1954).
(b) Is it necessary that the information gained by the
physician be confidential to come within the scope of the
privilege? Professor McCormick notes that even where
statutes codifying the marital communication privilege and
the attorney-client privilege have omitted the requirement that
the communications involved be confidential, the courts have
read this requirement into the statutes as a prerequisite to the
privilege. McCormick, Evidence § 104 (1954). He urges the
desirability of such a limitation in the physician-patient re-
lationship, noting that the privilege is at best obstructive to
the truth and that the purpose of encouraging disclosure of
facts which the patient might otherwise be reluctant to reveal
to his physician will be served adequately despite such a
limitation. The reasoning seems convincing. If such a limita-
tion is read into the statute, the presence of a third person not
an intimate member of the patient's family and not a necessary
attendant at the examination might well preclude a finding
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that the disclosure was confidential and thus eliminate the
privilege.
The reasoning thus far applies to voluntary communications
from the patient to the physician. The Virginia statute, how-
ever, speaks in terms of "any information" gained by the
physician. The statute also adds the qualification that such
information be necessary to enable the physician to furnish
professional care to the patient. Keeping this language in
mind, it would seem that information as to facts concerning
the condition of the patient which would be obvious to casual
lay observation would not be within the scope of the privilege.
The divulgence of such facts would not be dependent upon the
physician-patient relationship. However, other facts of a more
"subtle" character, not discernible from casual observation,
such as the mental condition of the patient, or even the fact
that he is under the influence of alcohol when the physician is
summoned to give treatment after an accident, may be treated
as privileged. This is true if such facts are necessary to enable
the physician to furnish professional care. The question of
necessity, in turn, may be a question of fact varying according
to the circumstances of each case, but Professor McCormick
notes decisions in which the latter case mentioned has been
made to turn on this question. McCormick, Evidence § 103 n.3
(1954:).
Finally, it might be queried, as a slight departure from the
topic suggested by this section heading, whether or not the
statute requires that the information gained be in fact neces-
sary to enable the physician to treat the patient. This literal
requirement would force the uninformed patient to guess at
his peril and, consequently, would seem to be destructive of
the policy supporting the privilege. Accordingly, Professor
Mlorgan states: "It is believed that the test should be whether
the patient or physician reasonably believed the matter to be
necessary or helpful." Morgan, Basic Problems of Evidence
111-12 (1954).
(c) What circumstances constitute a waiver of the privi-
lege? The Virginia statute expressly eliminates one of the
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major obstacles to approval of the privilege by providing that
the privilege is inapplicable when the physical or mental
condition of the patient is in issue. The provision precludes
the spectacle of the patient who flaunts his physical or mental
condition before the court in an action for damages and at the
same time forecloses inquiry into these matters from the
adverse party by claiming the privilege. In the absence of such
a provision, some cases have held that the patient does not
waive his privilege if he testifies as to his condition without
revealing privileged disclosures. See, e.g., Harpman v. Devine,
133 Ohio St. 1, 10 N.E. 2d 776, 114 A.L.R. 789 (1937). On the
other hand, Professor McCormick notes with disapproval that
the mere fact that the patient reveals privileged matter on
cross-examination without claiming the privilege is generally
held not to be a waiver of the privilege so as to permit further
inquiry of the physician by the patient's adversary. The notion
here is that the patient's disclosures were not "voluntary."
McCormick, Evidence § 106 (1954). It might also be noted that
under the fairly emphatic language of the Virginia statute the
fact that the patient's physical or mental condition is in issue
should abrogate the privilege not only when the patient is a
party but also in a proceeding in which such condition is a
factor of the claim or defense of one claiming through the
patient. The Model Code of Evidence so provides in Rule 223
§ 3. Finally, it is generally agreed that a contractual waiver of
the privilege is valid and binding. This might occur, for ex-
ample, in an application for insurance. Morgan, Basic Prob-
lems of Evidence 107 (1954).
5. Should an unfavorable inference from the claim of the
privilege be permitted?
Professor Morgan suggests that the rules applicable to the
attorney-client privilege should be applicable here. Morgan,
Basic Problems of Evidence 114 (1954). However, the rules
referred to by Morgan are unsettled and the cases conflicting.
The problem can arise in three ways: (a) Should one party be
permitted to place his opponent's physician on the stand to
press an inquiry and thus force a claim of the privilege in the
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presence of the jury or, perhaps accomplish the same result
by asking the party himself in 'examination if he intends to
claim the privilege to prevent his physician from testifying?
(b) Should counsel be permitted to comment in argument to
the jury on his opponent's claim of the privilege? (c) Should
the trial judge be permitted to charge the jury to the effect
that they may draw an unfavorable inference from the conduct
of a party in claiming the privilege? McCormick, Evidence
§ 80 (1954). Va. Code Ann. § 19-238 (1950), which deals with
the right of the accused to testify, provides that "his failure
to testify shall create no presumption against him, nor be the
subject of any comment before the court or jury by the
prosecuting attorney." However, this is an aspect of the privi-
lege against self-incrimination, which is not entirely an-
alogous to our physician-patient privilege, and Va. Code §
8-289 (1950), which creates a privilege for marital confidence,
does not contain any such stipulation. The Uniform Rules of
Evidence, in Rule 39, prohibit generally any comment on the
exercise of a privilege, except that comment is allowed on the
failure of the accused in a criminal case to testify under Rule
23(4), but the Model Code of Evidence is contra in Rule 233,
which allows both the judge and counsel to comment on the
claim of a privilege. The weight of authority prohibits such
comment. Uniform Rules of Evidence, Rule 39, Comment. Pro-
fessor McCormick, too, makes the convincing point that if
one conceives that some of the privileges answer an effec-
tive demand that will persist and thus that the main cost
of keeping out crucial facts essential to a case or defense
will continue to be paid, then the small change of inference
had better be sacrificed also, in the interest of practical
trial administration. The pull-and-haul of argument about
why the blinders were put on the horse will divert time
and attention that the jury could better spend in consider-
ing the evidence that did get in. McCormick, Evidence
§ 81 (1954).
This thought, however, would not seem to force an assumption
that the privilege will be claimed and thereby prevent one
party from at least taking the step of calling the other party's
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physician as a witness. In the first place, the privilege may not
be claimed by the patient. In the second place, if it is claimed
it may not be allowed under the express language of the statute
or allowed under an exercise of discretion by the trial judge.
